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On The Macroeconomic Effects of Establishing Tradability in
Weak Property Rights 1
by
Gunnar Eliasson, KTH (Royal Technical University), 10044 Stockholm, Sweden
Fax: +46 8622 6914
and
Clas Wihlborg, CBS (Copenhagen Business School), Copenhagen, Denmark
E-mail: cw.fi@cbs.dk; fax: +45 3815 3600

Abstract
The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology,
notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in the difficult-to-define
intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of underinvestment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market
environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the
rights to access, use, and trade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off
between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened
property rights depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to secure property rights,
and the protection offered by law. Economic property rights can be strengthened if the
originator can find innovative ways to charge for the intangible assets. The extreme
complexity of the New Economy and the large number of possible innovative private contract
arrangements make it more important to facilitate the use and enforcement of private
individualized contracts to protect intellectual property than to rely only on standard mandatory patent and copyright law. Enabling law is one proposed solution. Current patent
legislation in the US has led to costly litigation processes weakening the position of small
firms and individuals in patent disputes. The property rights of such firms and individuals
could be strengthened with insurance or arbitration procedures.
Key words: Competence bloc theory, Enabling law, Experimentally Organized Economy,
New Economy, Weak property rights, Tradability, Underinvestment.
JEL Code: D21, D23, D52, D82, H54, K11, K22, K41, L11, L23, M13, O14, O33.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 9th Congress of the International Joseph A.
Schumpeter Society (ISS), Gainesville, Florida, USA, March 28-30, 2002.
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The paper is part of the large Nödfor project on Schumpeterian Creative Destruction, notably the exit and
bankruptcy process, based at the Ratio Institute, Stockholm
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I Introduction
The existence of markets depends on the establishment of property rights. The reallocation of
property rights through trade is central to the capacity of the economy to enhance economic
welfare. Since at least Arrow 1962 we have had an academic debate on a presumed underinvestment in knowledge and information assets with high social relative to private returns.
Under-investment has been linked to a possible lack of incentives and badly defined property
rights (Kremer 1997). Hence, the proper design of, and the support of property rights should
be a central concern of any central authority or Government. North and Thomas (1973) even
argue that not until a good institutional foundation (read legislation and conventions
supporting property rights) had been laid in Western Europe did the industrial revolution
begin, based on technology and knowledge that had been accumulated during the previous
centuries. Implicit in their argument was that nations that did not get their institutions right,
could not benefit from the technology of the industrial revolution despite a sufficient
endowment of technology and production knowledge.

The evolving structures of the New Economy are to an increasing extent composed of digital
abstractions of intangible assets with difficult-to-define property rights. Although the social
value of these assets can be high, and enhanced by the Internet, the originators may not be able
to charge a price for individuals’ access to the assets. The Internet is a ”double-edged sword”.
On the one hand, it enhances the social value of these assets. On the other hand, it makes them
increasingly accessible for potential users and, hence, difficult to charge for. The analysis of
difficult to define property rights within endogenously changing structures of intangible assets
requires a dynamic, Schumpeterian type model framework. To that end we introduce the
Experimentally Organized Economy (Eliasson 1992) populated by ignorant rather than fully,
or marginally uninformed actors.

The industrial policy debate has often focused on a presumed under-investment in knowledge
creation due to lack of incentives, notably in investments with a high social return. Incentives
to do so are, in turn, closely related to the design and enforcement of property rights. Thus, for
instance, investment rich in spillovers, but with a low private return may not be made, even
though the social return is very high, because the originator cannot appropriate the value of
the spillovers privately (Eliasson 2001b).
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Property rights are more or less easily established depending on type of assets. You can
exercise your (property) right to an apple by holding it in your hand, and selling it to your
neighbor who knows that it came from your garden. The (property) right to residential
property and land is more complicated since it stretches over time. In the distant past also this
right was upheld by physical presence; living there and defending the lot with weapons. Today
such property rights in civilized countries are enforced by elaborate registers and the legal
system.

The difficulties of exercising property rights escalate with the degree of abstraction of the
assets. The highly abstract rights in securities markets to the future profits from an investment
commitment today took a long time to establish (Eliasson 1993). In a very obvious way the
world political system was being overtaken during the last decade of the millennium by
trading in financial abstractions (mathematical algorithms) representing property rights
guaranteed by the legal systems of nations and, more importantly, by mutual trust between,
and conventions among financial institutions (Eliasson and Taymaz 2002, Eliasson and
Wihlborg 1998).

Perhaps the most difficult and perhaps also the most important property right for the New
Economy is intellectual property. One aspect of the New Economy is the great share of asset
values explained by intangible knowledge and information. A second aspect is the technology
enabling transfers of information extremely cheaply and rapidly by means of digital
abstractions on the Internet.

We argue in this paper that the capacity of nations to establish efficient institutions for
property rights to intangible assets will be decisive for nations’ abilities to successfully enter
the New Economy2. Our focus is on the spectrum of more or less weak property rights
between no right – and no tradability – and completely uncontested rights to intangible assets.
Since none of the extremes exists property rights cannot be regarded as either or, as is
conventional practice in literature. Even when legal rights exist the economic property rights
can be contested and weak. The degree of contestability of property rights depends on law,
precedent and convention and especially on private costs of protecting the rights by various
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means. Rights of entering contractual arrangements for using an intangible asset affect the
contestability of property rights. We argue that costs of a particular way of protecting property
rights include lost opportunities as well as outright transaction costs. We question the efficacy
of conventional legal approaches to protecting intellectual property rights for the important
assets of the New Economy. Contractual arrangements should be supported, however, by
enabling law.

In Section II the concepts of the macroeconomic setting are described as an ”experimentally
organized” economy, wherein ”competence blocs” play an important role. The importance of
intangible assets is emphasized. In Section III we focus on the link between intellectual
property and economic growth. Section IV reviews literature on the efficiency of patent
protection, and we argue that the ”under-investment” literature does not capture important
characteristics of intellectual property in the New Economy. The transactions costs approach
to property rights is reviewed in Section V. We borrow the idea of redefining transaction costs
to include also the costs of business mistakes, which are typical of the experimentally
organized economy, from the conference companion paper Eliasson – Eliasson (2002a), and
derive the implications of this approach for property rights formation in the New Economy,
and in competence blocs in particular. The implications of the new digital world and Internet
technology for economic property rights and indirectly for economic growth are discussed in
Section VI before concluding in Section VII.

II Intangible Assets, Their Valuation and the Experimentally Organized
Economy
The valuation of, and trading in intangible assets in an experimentally organized economy
featuring frequent business mistakes are studied from a property rights and efficiency
perspective, using competence bloc theory.

II.1 Valuing assets
It was, and still is, almost a dictum within the accounting profession that the measurement of
intangible assets is a hopeless, arbitrary task. However, some three decades ago the economics
2

See also Eliasson, Johansson and Taymaz 2002, on Simulating the New Economy
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profession was entrenched in an intellectual conflict called the capital controversy (see for
instance Robinson 1964, Solow 1963). The winning side concluded that capital in general
(physical or not) as a factor of production was theoretically unmeasurable, since its value
could not be theoretically separated from its return. A more meaningful approach, however,
would be to say: yes of course, but there are still methods of estimating capital or asset values,
that can serve as useful approximations in many contexts if one knows what one is doing. Our
main argument, however, is that there is no principal difference between measuring physical
and intangible capital, only a matter of degree in difficulty, and perhaps not even that. 3 For
instance, financial derivates and similar financial instruments are highly intangible and
abstract. They are constantly valued and traded in markets and are probably more concrete and
definable than many physical capital items. Most of these instruments are not patented,
although since the early 1970s new financial instruments (”mathematical algorithms”) have
been patentable in the US. This patentability was unambiguously established in 1998 when the
new (since 1982) Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) upheld a patent on a
software system in a law suit between Signature Financial Group and State Street Bank. 4 5

For our future discussion let us distinguish between hardware, intangible and entrepreneurial
assets (capital) 6 as in Table 1 (see Eliasson 2000a). Subtracting debt from the sum of the three
capital items we obtain an extended definition of net worth, as it is continuously valued and
traded in the stock market.
(Table 1 in about here)

The value of a firm is to a large extent embodied in people, or teams of people with tacit
competencies representing ”entrepreneurial competence”. Entrepreneurial teams dominate the
fate of large and small firms alike (Eliasson 1990a), but the individuals are always free to
leave the teams within the limits of their contractual obligations. This mobility creates a
valuation problem, since the mobile entrepreneurial competence affects the value of most of
the assets on the balance sheet of a firm.
3

See Kingston (2002).
The interesting thing is rather that the academics who had come up with the algorithms have rarely patented
them, signaling a great unawareness of the commercial opportunities of what they are doing in their research (see
Lerner 2000c).
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5

This decision explicitly rejected the notion that ”business methods” were inherently non patentable.

6

Entrepreneurial capital is intangible but also tacit and generally not codifiable.
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One problem with the mainstream neoclassical model is that capital is assumed to be
computable by conventional present value formula 7, and that no attention is being paid to the
competence of actors in financial markets in pricing the assets they value. It is assumed that
neither firm management nor stock market analysts and traders can make mistakes that
influence the long-term growth outcomes except for stochastic mistakes around the exogenous
equilibrium trajectory. The producer, the innovator, the entrepreneur and the (venture)
capitalist are all aggregated into one actor in the neoclassical model, and this one actor is
assumed to be more or less predictable and calculable, baring a stochastic term.

We argue that the valuation of, and capacity to trade in claims on a firm depend on the actors
in financial markets, who must understand the role in production of the three categories of
capital ( Eliasson 1990a,2003). For this we need an Austrian/Schumpeterian (1911) type
model in which business mistakes become a normal, non-stochastic phenomenon and failure
through exit a frequent consequence.

II.2 The experimentally organized economy – the growth connection
The by far most important prior assumption going into economic analysis – often without
prior comment – concerns the limited size and complexity of the models’ state space. We
prefer to call this space the investment opportunities space. This assumption on the size of the
opportunity space is decisive for the state of information that can theoretically exist in the
economy, and for understanding the existence and nature of markets and the dynamics of
economic growth.

By expanding state space (by assumption) far beyond the limits allowed in the models of New
Growth Theory and the models of asymmetrically informed markets of the Akerlof – Spence –
Stiglitz type (ASS), it has been demonstrated that growth occurs through the four categories of
selection or Schumpeterian creative destruction in Table 2 (see Eliasson 1996a, 2001a).
Among the four categories entry, reorganization, rationalization and exit, the last one

7

Recent developments in corporate finance have undermined the discounted cash flow model by introducing
”real options”. In particular, ”growth options” based on firms’ intangible assets and entrepeneurial capital are
viewed as a major share of firms’ values in the New Economy.
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involving the positive role of frequent business failure will play a particularly important role
in our growth analysis.

Three circumstances of importance for our further discourse should now be observed. First,
the creation and selection dynamics of the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of
Table 2 does not automatically lead to growth. If competence and incentives are lacking,
incumbent firms may contract and exit rather than invest and expand. Second, the
Schumpeterian creative destruction process of Table 2 can be seen as a dynamic allocation
scheme dominated by selection, i.e. creation through entry and failure through exit. The
creation side must also be supported by competence, notably by ability to create and discover
winners and carry them on through the competence bloc of Table 3B to industrial scale
production. Losers must be competed out of business and exit (item 4 in Table 2). Third, the
smooth functioning of this creative destruction process, being supported by entrepreneurial
and venture capital competence requires the support of an appropriate infrastructure of
institutions. This is where property rights enter to establish tradability in the knowledge or
competence categories that rule the allocation process
(Tables 2 and 3A, B in about here)

II.3 Competence bloc theory – innovative creation and competitive selection
With economic dynamics and growth being dominated by experimental selection, the
efficiency of that selection becomes important. One aspect of efficiency is defined by the
”minimization” of the economic consequences of the two types of business mistakes of Table
3A; keeping losers on the budget for too long and losing the winners. Competence bloc theory
explains how.
The competence bloc (Table 3B) lists the minimum number of actors/individuals with
competence needed to create, identify and carry winners on to industrial scale production and
distribution.

For such a successful and industrially dynamic outcome the competence bloc has to be
vertically complete and exhibit great horizontal variety, thereby reaching the critical mass
needed to guarantee potential winners’ increasing returns to continued search for resources
(see Eliasson and Eliasson 1996, Eliasson 2001(a). A competence bloc typically includes
several types of entrepreneurial capital. For didactic purposes one can observe that a large
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firm may internalize most, or all the competence functions of the competence bloc in one
hierarchy, thereby merging the innovative, entrepreneurial, venture capital and industrialist
functions into one aggregate, which is typical in neoclassical production analysis. IBM in fact
did this in its heyday during the 1980s. It was even an advanced customer to itself (Eliasson
1996a, pp. 175 ff). Alternatively, the competence bloc allows typical business functions to be
distributed over the market where different types of competence are applied and allocated in a
decentralized manner. It is argued in Eliasson and Eliasson (2002a) that decentralized
competence blocs maximize the exposure of each project to a competent and varied evaluation
and minimize the risk of losing a winner. The competence bloc solution has to be supported
by economic property rights that allow trading in intangible competence capital over markets
such that prices are correctly set for an efficient outcome. We return to this issue below.

III. Intellectual Property and Economic Growth
Economic growth occurs through the innovative creation and competitive selection of projects
at all levels of aggregation as projects are filtered and allocated through the competence bloc
(Tables 3) and introduced in the economy as new entries of ideas, projects or entire firms. The
process forces reorganization and change among incumbents, and it forces some actors to exit
(see Table 2). Eliasson and Taymaz (2000, and 2002) demonstrate in a micro to macro model
framework that a healthy exit process is critical for sustainable growth.

The endogenous Schumpeterian creative destruction process could be more or less efficient in
two ways. First, the creation and selection process in Table 2 can be more or less efficient in
terms of minimizing the costs of the two business errors noted in Table 3A. In particular,
losing winners as a result of deficient (vertically incomplete and/or horizontally narrow)
competence blocs is costly. Second, even if the competence exists, incentives to innovate may
be lacking due to a deficient property rights design and a weak capacity to reallocate
industrially valuable knowledge or competence through trade. Both factors would contribute
to an under-investment in innovative activity, even though the benchmark of what is best
possible is realistically unclear in the experimentally organized economy, in contrast to being
precisely and misleadingly well-defined in mainstream analysis.
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A country’s relative productivity depends on its capacity to absorb technology, observes Eaton
and Kortum (1995). Eliasson (1990a) denotes this capacity receiver competence. Except for
the US, continues Eaton and Kortum, OECD countries derive almost all of their productivity
growth from abroad. However, they also argue that countries still earn most of their returns to
innovation at home, while foreign countries are important sources of technology (Eaton and
Kortum 1994).

These references represent indirect evidence that (international) trade in industrial knowledge
matters. The trade can take many forms, however, depending on the design and protection of
property rights to knowledge. Since there is ample evidence that new technology stimulates
growth deficient tradability in knowledge might lead to under-investment in innovative
activity, less than efficient allocation of knowledge capital, and less growth than is potentially
possible. Hence, tradability matters. On the other hand, direct evidence in the economic
literature on the growth effects of legal property rights systems is weak. Lanjouw, Pakes and
Putnam (1996) point out that patent counts are imperfect measures of innovative output (read
R&D). They then go on to adjust raw patent data for their value to the holder to derive a better
measure of such output 8. They also show that the economic value of the patent depends on the
legal rules of patent protection. Aoki and Prusa (1995) observed that the Japanese patent
system has allowed rival firms to look at the application. In the US the information is not
available until the patent has been granted. 9 This implies, according to Aoki and Prusa, that
Japanese rival firms have had an information advantage when they planned and coordinated
their R&D efforts, which in turn should have lead to smaller but more frequent quality
improvements. Sakakibara and Branstetter (1999), however, found that the broadening of the
scope of patent protection in Japan 1988 did not produce a significant positive change in
innovative output in Japan.

The macro connection is invariably reached through an imposed equilibrium path, a method
established innovatively in the Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) article, and returned to theory
under the name of New Growth theory by inter alia Romer (1986). The positive macro growth
effects in these models depend critically on strong positive spillovers in innovative production
8
9

Cf. The method used by Jorgenson and Griliches 1967, not quoted.

Since November 2000 patent applications in the US are disclosed 18 months after having been filed (Johnson
and Popp 2001).
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feeding into investment and output through conventional neoclassical production function
analysis.

The New Growth models predict that expansion in innovative outputs leads to a permanent
increase in total factor productivity growth. This, however, may not be empirically correct
argues Porter and Stern (2000). Empirical ”evidence rather suggests that most OECD
economies have increased the size of their R&D workforce while experiencing (at best)
constant total factor productivity growth rates”. They go on to explain the role of ”ideas
production” in economic growth using patent stocks to estimate the strength of spillovers from
ideas – to – ideas. They find a small (but significant) effect of patent stocks on the level of
total factor productivity concluding that (op.cit., p. 27) ”ideas-driven growth may be feasible;
however, the size of such effects may be modest”. 10

Porter and Stern (2000) point to other factors such as ”the national (or even regional)
environment” that may be more important for understanding the dynamics of economic
growth. These other dimensions are exactly what we emphasize, namely the dynamics of
resource allocation on the micro level, notably of intellectual or competence capital embodied
in human beings, systematically excluded by assumption in the macro new growth models. It
is, however explicitly present in the experimental economy/competence bloc approach that
was presented above. The importance of tradability in intellectual production capital for
efficient allocation of the same intellectual capital stands out. The importance of the micro-tomacro dynamics of such allocation (see Tables 2 and 3B) has been quantitatively
demonstrated in Eliasson, Johansson and Taymaz (2002). One insight from this paper is that
the processes discussed in Porter and Stern (2000) are very drawn out in time, possibly
explaining some of their weak econometric results based on considerably shorter time series
data.

10

Kortum (1994), using a similar new growth theory model observes that while R&D employment and TFP have
both grown, the rate of productivity growth has remained flat. Eliasson, Johansson and Taymaz (2002) observe,
as one of their three paradoxes that such small effects probably depend on the long gestation periods involved,
effects being impossible to identify economically in short time series data. Instead E – J – T simulate the
macroeconomic effects of ideas, or technology creation and diffusion on a micro-to-macro model of the Swedish
economy using among other things genetic algorithms to model the learning and diffusion processes among
firms.
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IV Property Rights and Efficiency: The Applicability of the Literature on
Intellectual Property in the New Economy
There are two conflicting views on the role of patent rights in creating economic value. If
patent rights, for instance to intangible assets, cannot be established, incentives to invest in
such assets will be low and we have Arrow’s (1962) under-investment problem. On the other
hand firms will invest resources in the protection of their property (legal or otherwise) and
rival firms may engage in ”wasteful” expenditures or reverse engineering to go around
patents. Hence, there could be an over-investment problem (Hirschleifer 1971).
Arrow (1962) concluded that competitive markets do not provide supporting incentives for
innovative activity, but also that patent rights, establishing temporary property (monopoly)
rights to an intangible asset (a technology) may not be statically efficient. To make sure that
innovative activities take place despite the lack of incentives, these activities should be
conducted in publicly funded laboratories making ”innovations” freely available to everybody.
The 1962 article has exercised considerable influence on the debate about patents and the
organization of basic research. But Arrow (1962) did not incorporate a number of critical
empirical circumstances in his analysis. His analysis was carried out in a zero transactions cost
environment in which all knowledge -- once supported by legal rights -- was treated as
”tradable” information. In an economic theoretical environment where transactions costs are
dominant and exceeding 50 percent of all resource use in the economy (Eliasson 1990b) the
theoretical conclusions would be entirely different.

Arrow also did not consider that the efficiency of innovative activity is critically dependent on
its organization, and that the links between the academic laboratories and the industrial
introduction of innovations are long, weak and costly11. His analysis has led to an
overemphasis on academic research as a source of innovations. Basic technology development
in academic or firm laboratories only draws a tiny fraction of the resources needed to take new
technology to industrial scale production and distribution. Furthermore, technology is not only
information, and building a business on new technology requires considerable competence
and resources. The consequence of Arrow’s proposal might even be that no innovations would
reach industrial production. Hence, the main transactions cost associated with Arrow’s

11

Under Arrow’s (1962) assumptions the business idea of Karo Bio (case in Eliasson – Eliasson 2002a,
this conference) would have no empirical foundation.
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proposition has to be ”lost winners”, a possibility excluded by assumption in Arrow’s
analysis, however. Taken together, it is easy to reverse the conclusions of Arrow (1962) by
one or two minor modifications of its underlying (empirical) assumptions.

Another serious objection to Arrow’s analysis is that it looks at (and this is unavoidable in
static equilibrium analysis) the innovation as a well-defined optimum solution. In the
experimentally organized economy (EOE) there are no well-defined innovations, and above
all no determinate best innovations. Above all there is no fixed (fix point) reference for
efficiency comparisons. Attempts to invent around patents in the EOE (called waste in the
Arrow model) may be as innovative, and lead to as unique inventions as the original
innovation. In the context of the EOE and Austrian/Schumpeterian analysis waste becomes
undefined and as much an act of learning and renewed innovation as the original invention.
R&D subsidies would not improve upon the situation even though the social planner can now
exercise his influence (Kremer 1997). The evidence is overwhelming that subsidized
industrial research, especially research carried out in special government operated laboratories
is inefficient, does not turn out winners and leads to low social returns compared to private
research, rich in spillovers 12.

There is another dimension to property rights, which is always disregarded in perfect
competition analysis, namely the dynamics of the allocation of knowledge or new technology
over the actors within the competence bloc. Private economic property rights confer
tradability to the asset, which can now be sold to another owner who is more competent than
the innovator to build a business on the technology. The stronger property rights the more
tradable the asset and the more dynamically efficient the allocation of knowledge or
competence. Or, vice versa, if property rights are weakened, tradability is lowered and
economic value destroyed. This aspect of tradability becomes particularly important when
tacit knowledge is being considered. Tacit knowledge is embodied in human beings or groups
of human beings and is typically being reallocated through trade in the markets for executive
competence and strategic acquisitions.

12
(See Eliasson 1996b and 1997a) Also big companies invested in large central corporate laboratories during the
1970s and 1980s, on the assumption that they would churn out new basic technology. The results were not
positive (Eliasson – Granstrand 1985) and firms, in contrast to Governments, have been fast to close down such
facilities.
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An alternative to the proposed research subsidies would be patent buy-outs (Kremer 1997),
especially when based on auction pricing. One advantage of patent buy-outs is that they can be
more naturally placed in the environment of the EOE as long as research results can be
codified. In order not to kill incentives the buy- out should not be at a lower price than the
private value. To elicit the private value an auction could be used, and to avoid private rigging
of the auction sealed bids should be used. Kremer (1997) suggests that the Government should
offer the private value (the auction price) plus a mark up to cover the social value and that the
patent holder should always have the right to reject the offer. Since the social value of
research is normally much higher than the private value, governments should offer much more
to stimulate inventions with a high social value. Kremer (1997 p. 17) suggests that the latter is
at least twice the estimated private value. If the inventor refuses to sell, for instance because of
a strong information advantage, the system of patent buy-outs functions like the current patent
system. 13 Shavell and van Ypersale (1999) in fact argue that ”intellectual property rights do
not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems”.

It seems that the empirical literature on patent protection and efficiency comes out only
hesitantly in favor of patents 14. The reason appears to be a lingering negative attitude, or an
ideological aversion, towards creating and protecting private (even though temporary) profits.
Lerner (2000a),concludes from his 150 year survey of patent office practice that ”Nations
where information asymmetries between government officials and patentees are likely to be
more prevalent – larger countries, wealthier economies, and those where international trade is
more important – incorporate discretionary features into their patent systems more frequently”
and ”divide the responsibility for determining patentability between the patent officer and the
courts when information problems are likely to be severe”. ”Wealthier countries”, he
continues (Lerner 2000b) ”are more likely to have patent systems”, but ”they are also likely to
charge higher fees and limit patent protection”. ”The origin of a country’s commercial law
appears particularly important” in explaining how patent protection is decided, notably in
terms of awarding privileges and providing for discriminatory provisions.

13

Kremer (1997) presents an interesting case from pharmaceutical industry.

14

See Cohen – Nelson – Walsh (2000, p. 2) and also Kremer (1997).
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Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000) use the fact that much of the developing world has introduced
patent protection for new substances developed by the pharmaceutical industry during the
1980s to investigate the incentive effects; and find ”some, although limited, evidence” that
more research has been allocated to products ”specific to developing country markets”. 15

Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2000) find that the stock market values of companies correlate
strongly positively with their stock of patents, notably when they use “weighted patent
stocks 16 as an explanatory variable. Many researchers have been surprised to observe that US
manufacturing firms in most industries seem to rely more heavily on secrecy and lead time to
recoup their R&D investments than on patents. Despite the increasingly ”pro-patent” legal
environment in the US since the beginning of the 1980s, patents as a means of appropriating
R&D returns appear to have declined (see for instance Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000).
Despite this reported decline in effectiveness of patent protection, an unprecedented surge in
US patent applications has occurred at the same time (Kortum and Lerner 1997), notably in
semiconductor technologies, where patent protection effectiveness has been reported to be
particularly low. Hall and Ham (1999) conclude, from a study on the US semiconductor
industry 1980-1994 that we can understand this ”patent paradox” if we give up thinking in
terms of the simple ”innovation” or ”patent race” model, and instead reason in terms of
complex ”patent portfolios”, involving the many parties and many technologies and complex
contracts needed both to design and produce modern complex products and to safeguard and
appropriate their value. This resolves ”the patent paradox”. US semiconductor manufacturing
firms, indeed, patent aggressively since the ”pro-patent” legal environment was established in
the US in 1982; more to raise the positive signals to attract venture capital and to secure
proprietary rights in niche product markets than to protect and be able to license particular
technologies.

Pharmaceutical and biotech industry appears to be the exception everybody refers to where
patent protection is needed (Kremer 1997, pp. 46f), because once the substance formula has
been discovered most of the innovation costs have been expended and replication is easy.
Also here, however, exceptions are found. Zucker, Darby, Brewer and Peng (1995) observe

15
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The results are based on ”Indian Survey data, and interviews with industry”.

”References” or ”citations” in patents identify earlier inventions whose claims are close to the citing patent.
”Citations received” are often used to measure the ”generality” of the patent (Jaffe – Fogarty – Banks 1997).
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that intellectual capital in biotech often rests on tacit hands-on-experience that cannot be
commercialized as information to outsiders, except by knowledgeable people moving to a
competitor. ”Natural excludability” can be organized within closely-knit groups of
collaborators who share the rents. There is an academic dilemma, however. If the important
hands-on-experience cannot be communicated in coded form, academic control through repeat
experiments based on published material becomes impossible. Thus, academic peers will have
to do with checking the result (”the substance”) without understanding how the research team
got it out of the test tubes. Alternatively, if the process can be completely and exactly coded
for publication, it must be the case that biotech industry and academics have come up with a
rule system that allows the researcher to withhold temporarily critical process information
from publication.

Protection of knowledge is more difficult to handle when the knowledge derives from the
contractual cohesion of teams that make up the technological and entrepreneurial competence
that is decisive for the market value of the firm. If the team breaks up the value collapses.
Darby, Liu and Zucker (1999) use an option-pricing based technique to value the intangible
assets defined by the ties to star scientists in biotech firms. Then they compare values with the
market valuation of the same firms. The underlying hypothesis is that the more ties among
stars the greater the probability that a firm makes a commercially valuable R&D
breakthrough. This hypothesis is supported empirically. In fact, the value of a firm, they
estimate, increases with 7.3 percent or 16 millions in 1984 dollars with one article written by a
participating star scientist.

On the whole the empirical results imply that when patent protection of property can be well
defined it is effective and not very costly to obtain and to enforce. Firms then patent, and are
significantly more protected from imitation than they would otherwise be. This situation,
however, is not the general one and it changes radically when we consider intellectual
property, notably entrepreneurial assets (see Table 1) and the technologies of the New
Economy. The variability and complexity of the innovative technology to be protected
increase dramatically in the New Economy, as do the possibilities to protect through
innovative designs, contracts and organizations going beyond standard patent and copyright
law.
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V. Economic and Legal Property Rights in Economic Dynamics
In this section we review the transactions costs approach to property rights and apply it on
competence blocs. The costs of business mistakes listed in Table 3A must be considered when
assessing the efficiency of a system of property rights. We also argue that in the New
Economy a legal system using standard, mandatory contracts for various contractual relations
is not the most efficient way to protect the extremely varied assortment of entrepreneurial
assets. Instead the decentralized competence bloc must be based on the variety of contractual
arrangements that the experimentally organized economy demands.

V.1 The transactions costs approach to property rights
To go further in the analysis of property rights to the assets of the New Economy we follow
Barzel (1997) and distinguish between economic and legal property rights. Economic property
rights correspond to the ability of an agent to capture the present value of the cash flows the
asset is expected to generate, while legal rights are those specified in law. Agents can be
expected to maximize the value of economic rights by appropriating cash flows net of
transaction costs one way or the other. Transactions costs can take a variety of forms
associated with the protection of cash flows including direct costs, and potential opportunity
costs of inability to enter contracts and initiate activities that could generate cash flows.
Appropriation of cash flows, and thereby the creation of economic property rights also take
many different forms ranging from selling the asset, selling products incorporating the asset’s
services, selling products and services linked to the asset like TV and Internet advertising, to
the merging of firms controlling different assets that can be combined to create conditions for
appropriation of cash flows.

Imperfect or weak economic property rights imply that part of the potential cash flows from
an asset are in the ”public domain” in Barzel’s words. Thereby other agents have an incentive
to appropriate cash flows generated by the asset. Transactions costs arise in this competition
for cash flows in the public domain, as well as in attempts to retain appropriability.
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The extent to which economic property rights can be appropriated and thereby remain in the
”private domain” of the individual generating or holding an asset depends naturally on legal
rights to property but also on the ability of the asset holder to utilize the resource as he or she
sees fit. Restrictions on the rights to manage the resource in various activities affect the
division of the economic value of the resource into the private and public domains. A great
variety of legal rights and obligations affects this division.

If economic property rights were perfect so that all cash flows potentially generated by an
asset could be appropriated, and placed in the private domain at zero transactions costs, then
private incentives and social objectives would be aligned. The value of externalities would
then be appropriated as well. This proposition follows from the Coase theorem. If there are
costs associated with appropriation, then the economic policy problem is more complex.
Benefits and costs associated with the creation of economic property rights to any asset with
social value must include the opportunity costs of not creating such rights. A common
example is that it would be very costly to define rights to the air we breathe, while if we do
not, then non-smokers face costs of drifting smoke or vice versa. In a world with transaction
costs to establish economic property rights there is no clear reference point for economic
policy but always a trade off between different kinds of transactions’ costs and benefits. It is
particularly important to consider that any particular way of establishing economic property
rights implies that there will be missed opportunities that are hard to identify.

As noted the appropriation of knowledge-and information assets is particularly costly for wellknown reasons. Several types of costs are associated with appropriation or lack thereof. For
example, the value of information cannot often be extracted in the market for the information
per se, because a potential buyer cannot assess the value without obtaining the information.
Another type of cost exists because the value of knowledge is often enhanced by so called
network effects creating scale economies and potential ”natural monopolies”. On the other
hand, anti-trust legislation would then have opportunity costs in terms of lost economies of
scale. Also, the value of a particular kind of knowledge depends on what other types of
knowledge it can ”join” in the production process for goods and services, and on the available
expertise with an ability to utilize the knowledge.
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An advantage of a competence bloc is that the varied competences within the bloc increase the
likelihood that someone will be able to understand the potential economic value of a particular
kind of knowledge or information. The bloc is also more likely to contain the entrepreneurial
capital required to organize economic activities in such a way that the private domain of the
value of the asset is maximized. Hence, in a complete and varied competence bloc the risk of
losing winners is ”minimized” and losers are more likely to be weeded out rapidly.

The theory of the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE) makes the economic value of
business mistakes explicit. The mainstream economic model does not when focusing on the
net present values of assets under the assumption that the opportunity sets for uses of assets
are known. In the EOE the opportunity set is itself determined by, for example, the system of
property rights and the organization of activities in hierarchies or in decentralized markets.
The frequency and magnitude of business mistakes within a certain property rights system for
asset should be recognized as a cost of that system. Eliasson and Eliasson (2002 a and b)
argue that business mistakes are more costly in a hierarchically organized competence bloc
than within a decentralized competence bloc where there are many independent,
experimenting entrepreneurs controlling different assets. Also the learning from business
mistakes is more rapid in a decentralized bloc. An additional efficiency issue to be discussed
is how economic property rights to intangible assets are protected in competence blocs.

V.2 Enhancing economic value through the legal system
Economic rights to intellectual property can be enhanced either by the strengthening of legal
property rights or by entrepreneurs and firms organizing their activities in such a way that a
minimum of cash flows potentially generated by an asset goes into the public domain. The
most well-known legal property rights are created by patent, copyrights, and trade mark
legislation. The strength of the rights created by this legislation depends on enforcement by
the courts but also on the information contained in the creation of patents in particular. Once a
firm has applied for patent protection the application is in the public domain. Thereby
competitors obtain potentially valuable information that may enable them to develop close
substitutes or give them time to strategically reorganize their business. For this reason certain
types of knowledge and technology are not patented.
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The empirical evidence reviewed in the previous section indicates that substantial benefits of
patent protection are limited to specific industries: in particular to those using knowledge to
produce output with designs that can be easily imitated after observation of the product or
service. Even such knowledge can be protected to some extent by the original producer’s first
comer advantage, and the protection can be prolonged by brand name reputation. Most
knowledge and information being used as input in production of goods and services is not that
easily accessible. Exclusivity in the supply of know-how may exist, because the know-how
itself is not sufficient to put it to use. It is common that observable product know-how must be
combined with some unobservable knowledge or any privately held asset.

It is by no means obvious that strong legal property rights are superior to private methods for
enhancing economic rights 17 to intangible intellectual property even if it is codified. There are
transactions costs associated with enforcement of legal rights in the form of direct costs of
enforcement, and a loss of value when a patent application is made public. Costs of monopoly
power created by patent or copyright protection must also be considered. An important
transactions costs of enforceable legal property rights can be the disincentive for potential
competitors to invest in the development of competing technology. Thereby, the underinvestment problem can actually be made more severe. Furthermore, if trade in the patented
knowledge cannot occur, the monopoly owner of knowledge assets may not employ it as
productively as a competitor would have.

Private contractual arrangements can contribute substantially to the creation of economic
property rights even if legal property rights are not explicitly, or only weakly, protected in law.
The extent to which an intangible asset’s value lies in the private versus public domain
depends on the ability of the asset holder to retain exclusive control over cash flow generated
by the asset. Contractual agreements between an asset holder and a buyer of the asset (or the
services provided by it) can be used to appropriate the value of the asset when the information
contained in the asset can be kept exclusive. For example, the generator of a particular kind of
know-how can supply this know-how to someone else while specifying restrictions on the use
and resale of the know-how. It is quite common with patented knowledge that license

17

See Davis (2002a) and Jonasson (2001 and 2002) on “innovative pricing” for a discussion of corporate
strategies aimed at appropriating cash flows. Reichman (2001) discusses “Repackaging Rights” as a way of
establishing economic property rights.”
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agreements are entered specifying restrictions on the licensee’s use of the knowledge, but
contracts can be entered without patents. The role of the formal patent in such cases is to
provide proof of origin of a technology and the exact delineation of the property being
licensed. The existence of the patent may reduce the complexity of the contract and serve a
function similar to the registration of real estate. The advantage of the patent in this case must
be weighed against disadvantages mentioned above.

There are two factors limiting contractual arrangement for the transfer of information and
codified knowledge. One factor is that the value of the information may not be easily assessed
by a potential buyer without revelation of it. The second factor is that enforcement of a
contract requires that leakage of information to a third party can be traced to its source. We
argue in the next section that Internet technology weakens both arguments against private
contracting for securing economic property rights to intangible assets.

V.3 Competence blocs and trade in intangibles
Returning to the benefits of competence blocs, it can be argued that a complete and varied
such bloc, with a variety of generators and users of intangible assets, raises the likelihood that
winners of any particular kind generated within the bloc will be identified. If the intangible
assets can be traded, then the competence bloc can be organized as a group of firms with
different entrepreneurial capital, while if the asset cannot be traded, the competence bloc is
more likely to be organized as a large firm with many kinds of entrepreneurial capital ”under
one hat”. Within this firm the trade in intangibles is ”internalized”. Most likely the selection
of projects will now be more narrow (less innovative) and the risk of losing winners larger as
noted above.

When it comes to more complex intangible assets such as entrepreneurial know-how or other
types of capital that are not only intangible but also tacit, and by definition not codified,
contractual arrangements become even more important for the appropriation of economic
value. In this case the tacit, intangible, knowledge asset is typically embodied in a person or a
group of persons who can appropriate cash flows only through contractual agreements with
financiers, employees, and other potential stakeholders in a firm. The greater the contractual
freedom of the entrepreneur, the greater is the possibility that the economic value of the know-
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how can be appropriated by the entrepreneur. Restrictions on the contractual agreement
between an entrepreneur and suppliers of financing in the form of mandatory standard form
formulations of contracts in law can reduce the value of the entrepreneurial capital. In other
words it is desirable that law is enabling with respect to the contractual arrangements among
stakeholders (Wihlborg 1998a,b). 18

Competence blocs in the experimentally organized economy make it possible to combine two
or more kinds of tacit, intangible entrepreneurial competences to create new ventures. The
most productive form of such ventures may be joint ventures, strategic alliances or outright
mergers of firms (Eliasson and Eliasson 2002a). The greater the potential variety of possible
contractual arrangements between those possessing the entrepreneurial assets, the greater the
likelihood that the most productive forms of cooperation can be found through experimentation. Mandatory standard form contracts for alliances and joint ventures may reduce the
ability of one or both entrepreneurs to appropriate values. Standard form contracts that are
enabling in the sense that parties can deviate from the standard form by mutual agreement
reduce the likelihood that winning combinations of knowledge will not become reality.

VI Economic Property Rights and the Social Value of Intellectual
Property on the Internet
In this section we discuss how Internet technology affects the costs associated with legal
property rights and their enforcement. Thereafter, we turn to the protection of economic
property rights on the Internet.
Digital products and production in the New Economy are making the property rights to
difficult to define intangible assets increasingly important. The Internet is a key technology
shifting economic attention towards intangibles and business concerns towards strengthening
weak property rights.

The private creator of a positive externality wants to be able to manage, earn a profit from and
to trade in the values he has created, i.e. to claim property rights to them. If the property right
18

See Kingston (2002) for a practical contribution to valuation of intellectual property. Valuation with some
degree of precision is one aspect of tradeability.
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cannot be naturally asserted, for instance by holding the apple in your hand, there are two
ways; (1) legal protection and (2) innovative contractual, organizational or strategic
arrangements as discussed by Davis (2002a) and denoted innovative pricing (IP) by Jonasson,
(2002). IP is a way to establish of weak property rights by means of, for example, innovative
product and marketing strategy, and one method of internalizing an externality. Obviously, if
IP can be made effective, the existence of external receiver competence raises the value of the
spillover to the originator. It may even be in the interest of the latter to invest in raising
receiver competence among customers to raise the value of its product to the customer, to be
able to charge a higher price (see Eliasson 2001b).

VI.1 Enforcement and litigation costs

The US legal system has expanded its recognition of legal property rights (Davis 2002a), but
Europe has not. Thus European firm must rely on IP to a greater extent than must American
firms selling in Europe. To the extent European firms do not enter the US market they could
otherwise become free riders on concepts and ideas developed in the US. More likely the costs
of expanding legal rights to concepts and ideas will create enormous costs of litigation, since
ideas and concepts are often ”in the air” and being formulated in many places more or less
simultaneously. Creating exclusive rights to one among many idea-originators may create
substantial costs in terms of restrictions on the use of the ideas.

In assessing the role of legal intellectual property rights Lanjouw and Lerner (1997), LL
below, emphasize the costs of enforcement, which appear to be large and increasing in the US
in particular. Litigation is a part of, and a significant part of the expected transactions costs
associated with establishing a tradable property right. Enforcement of legal property rights and
the associated expected litigation costs are particularly important when it comes to
establishing tradable intellectual property rights. In fact, new financial products addressing
patent litigation costs have emerged in the market. It is possible to invest in part-ownership in
patents solely for the purpose of litigating them. A patent enforcement insurance market also
appears to be emerging (Hofman 1995).

The empirical evidence presented by LL for the USA indicates that the broader the patent the
more asymmetric is the information between patent holder and patent infringer, and the higher
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is the probability of litigation. The broader the patent the greater is also the stake of the
plaintiff and the more valuable is the patent and the firm holding the patent. Furthermore, the
more revolutionary the patent, the broader is often the patent coverage and the larger is the
number of patent citations. The number of patent citations is ”strongly” correlated with the
probability of an infringement suit”. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) furthermore find that
more valuable patents, notably those in new technology areas are ”more likely to be involved
in litigation”.

There is also strong evidence that large firms use their financial leverage to take small firms to
court (LL, 1997) and that larger and financially strong firms predate on less financially healthy
firms through patent litigation (LL, 1996). Since small firms are significantly more innovative
than large firms (see Acs and Audretsch 1988, and Eliasson and Eliasson 2002a), and small
firms seem to be the creative origin of the revolutionary new technology moving the New
Economy, this bias in transactions costs may hold back the emergence of a new economy.

An interesting observation in this context is that the probability of being involved in a patent
suit is much higher for valuable patents and/or for patents owned by individuals and smaller
firms. Patentees with large portfolios of patents to trade, on the other hand, encourage
”cooperative” interaction and avoid court action more successfully (Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2001). The bad side, again, is that the smaller the firm holding the patent the
more vulnerable it is. This encourages the large firms to predate on small firms to acquire
patents cheaply. Thus, efficient incentives to innovate and to allocate intellectual assets in a
property rights system with wide scope as in the US require that small firms and individuals
are able to protect themselves against the possibility that they will face large litigation costs.

Kingston (2000) argues that insurance arrangements for protection of intellectual property of
small firms are not likely to work for reasons of moral hazard. He favors instead arbitration
procedures, since disputes are intrinsically technical in nature. Furthermore, the arbitration
procedures should be compulsory because voluntary procedures would not be accepted by
financially, relatively strong parties. Thereby the litigation costs associated with the legal
property rights system could be reduced.
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A legal system with more narrow legal protection of intellectual property rights would have to
rely on contractual, organizational, or strategic approaches (IP) to protection of economic
property rights. To the extent contractual approaches are used legal enforcement costs would
exist but to a lesser extent if contracts are specifically designed for the parties, and possibly
combined with organizational and strategic innovation. Such innovations carry themselves
costs, however. An issue is how these costs are affected by the new technology.

VI.2 Realizing the potential value of the Internet through economic property rights
In 1837 Daguerre offered to sell his photography process to a single buyer for 200.000 francs
or to 100 to 400 subscribers for 1000 francs each. (See Kremer 1997, pp. 11 ff) Nobody was
willing to buy, either because they did not understand the potential of photography and/or
found the offer to expensive. Somebody close to the French Government, however, must
have understood the economic potential of photography and convinced the French
Government to purchase the patent from Daguerre in 1937 to make the patent freely available
to the world for a lifetime pension offer 19, considerably larger than what Daguerre had tried
to elicit from the private market. Privately this patent buy-out may have looked generous.
Socially, however, the deal was a winner for the world. In terms of economic insight it
compares extremely favorably and fairly with the deal offered Swedish inventor Håkan Lans
by the UN and the large IT-companies in 2001 for his patent on a GPS-based Global
Positioning & Communications (GP&C) system. To become a global standard Håkan Lans
had to turn over his patent to the world for free.
These examples illustrate the potentially enormous social values that may flow from
intellectual property. The Internet is itself an intellectual innovation with potential social value
of magnitudes that cannot be imagined 20. To realize the potential value conditions for
establishing economic property rights to information on the Internet must be understood and
clarified.
19

20

Of 6000 francs per year, corresponding to some $1.8 million in 1988.

Timothy J. Berners-Lee passed up great wealth when he - in 1990- decided not to patent the technology used to
create the WWW. A similar problem is coming up with the project on a semantic web in which Berners - Lee is
also involved. IBM and Microsoft have proposed to install toll boots on the information highway to allow
patented software to be used. Berners-Lee is against such arrangements as are the Free Software Foundation and
the Open Source Initiative ( Business Week , March 4.,2002, pp.83-87).
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The open access of the Internet is the cause of an enormous increase in general accessibility of
information. Much information on the Internet is literally in the public domain by a simple
click. From the point of view of property rights, this implies that costly arrangements must be
introduced to establish exclusivity of information and thereby to place it in the private
domain. Alternatively, appropriation of the economic value of information on the Internet can
take place by indirect means. By indirect means we mean, for example, advertising on a website with valuable information, or enhancement of the value of a product supplied separately.
The technology related to the Internet is rapidly developing with potentially important
consequences for economic property rights. First, electronic contracting can be expected to
become widespread, secure, and enforceable in the near future with the support of courts’
acceptance of electronic signatures (Hultmark 1999). Second, all activities on the Internet
leave an imprint which enables the flow of information to be traced. There are also ways of
hiding or obscuring the source of information flows but technology is moving in the direction
of greater ability to trace flows from computer to computer 21. This characteristic of the
Internet is already seen as a threat to privacy in many dimensions. The third characteristic of
the Internet with potential consequences for property rights is that very tiny pieces of digital
information can be identified and potentially transferred exclusively. In combination with
electronic contracting and ability to trace information flows it should be possible to define
economic property rights to very small pieces of information. The limitation to the
appropriation of the economic value of tiny pieces of information lies not in the size or
magnitude of the information but in the cost of enforcement relative to the economic value of
the information. Proposals exist on the Internet for organizing the information flows through a
database in such a way that enforcement through tracing can be made very cheap. The
database would contain many individuals’ small and large pieces of information, and it would
enable members of the database to trade in ”information assets”. Contracts restricting the use
of information on the database could be enforced by the organizer of the database. 22.

If economic property rights to tiny pieces of information can be realized, the consequences for
both economic activity and privacy can be great. For example, the tracing of flows can now be
21

Windows 2000. Also see Jonasson (2001, ch. 4).

22

See www.preference.tv
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used by firms to identify preference patterns of consumers. If rights to tiny pieces of
information can be enforced, then individuals could claim the economic rights to information
about their preferences with respect to products and services, and their specification. If so,
they could contract with providers of Internet services that information about their use of the
Internet must not be sold. Instead, individuals’ preferences would be available at a price, and
even very small payments could be made nearly costless on the Internet. Also on the
production side the ability to trade in tiny pieces of information could have important
consequences. Economic rights to a greater range of intangible assets would be defined. Tacit,
entrepreneurial capital would be devoted to combine the pieces in new productive ventures.
The virtual entrepreneur and the virtual competence blocs may become reality.

VII

Conclusions on the Role of Patent and Copyright Protection in

Economic Growth
Most or all analyses of patent and copyright protection has been carried out within the
assumptional constraints of the mainstream imperfect information/asymmetric information
model of I/O analysis. We believe that the intellectual constraints of that model bias both the
theoretical and the empirical results. We have, therefore, based our analysis on the
assumptions of the experimentally organized economy (EOE) in which actors are not
marginally uninformed, but grossly ignorant about circumstances critical for their long run
survival and constantly make more or less serious, often fatal business mistakes. Since this
model has no fixed (external equilibrium) reference for efficiency or opportunity cost
measurements the definition of transactions costs must consider opportunities for
experimentation. To come up with any firm conclusions on the role of patent and copyright
protection in supporting the introduction of a possible New Economy we have, therefore,
approached the problem in steps.

First, we have introduced the concept of weak property rights and imperfect tradability of
(intangible) assets as a normal phenomenon in the Experimentally Organized Economy
(section II) and then (second) linked that tradability to the efficiency in allocating the same
assets to generate economic growth (section III). Third, we have assessed the role of patent
protection in general in promoting economic growth. This is where the bulk of literature is to
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be found (section IV). Fourth, we have looked at the particular assets (intellectual property)
associated with the Internet and other technologies of the New Economy (section V).
With this, we have addressed the difficult and specific problem of less than perfect (weak )
property rights and the less than perfect tradability in the assets that move growth in the New
Economy, an aspect of reality that is incompatible with the mainstream model and, therefore,
almost completely missing in literature. The analysis has been conducted in therms of the
theory of the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE) and we are now ready for the two
main conclusions of this essay.

In the EOE costs of business mistakes, notably lost winners, are potentially very large. This
analytical outcome of the theory is consistent with a true endogenization of growth. We apply
the theory of competence blocs within the EOE to understand how the costs of such business
mistakes can be ” minimized”. As a consequence of this redefinition of the benchmark for
opportunity cost ”measurements”, the implications of tradability of intangible production
capital for dynamically efficient resource allocation change radically relative to the
mainstream model. The direct transactions costs for protecting and handling innovations
within a hierarchy are relatively low. The implicit costs of business mistakes, on the other
hand, are large. The incidence of business mistakes increases when competence bloc selection
is internalized within one hierarchy and opportunity costs escalate when the economic value
of the loss of winners (loss in output) are taken into account. A decentralized market based
competence bloc increases observable transactions costs compared to those in a narrowly
controlled hierarchy (Eliasson-Eliasson 2002a), but reduces the loss of winners. Since the
opportunity cost of business mistakes are not recognized in the mainstream imperfect
information/asymmetric information model except as a minor stochastic error term,
comparison with the two theoretical models produce radically different theoretical
conclusions, the mainstream model favoring central planning by assumption.

Our analysis of the dynamic efficiency of allocation, on the other hand, favors a decentralized,
market based system. The efficiency of that decentralized allocation depends, however, on the
possibilities of establishing tradability in intangible assets, such that a smooth and competent
selection through the competence bloc can be achieved. This first conclusion implies that
economic property rights are important, but it does not say much about legal property rights.
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Practically all empirical studies on patent and copyright protection have been intellectually
formed within the imperfect market/asymmetric information model and have neglected this
tradability aspect. The survey of literature comes out rather inconclusive in favor of traditional
legal patent protection, indicating also that the complexity of reality requires more innovative
and varied designs to protect the economic value of intellectual property.

Our analysis, placed in the context of the experimentally organized economy (EOE) and the
Computing & Communications technology of the New Economy adds a new dimension of
complexity. The number of possible arrangements to claim economic property rights is very
large, as are the number of opportunities of protecting intellectual properties through
innovative private designs of contracts, organizations, and product-and marketing strategies.
This variation is costly to maintain, but those costs should be seen in the context of the
enormous gains that can be captured in the form of lower total transactions costs, and in the
form of a smaller loss of winners. The computing and communications technology of the New
Economy is adding to that complexity and raising the stakes of the game. Hence, our second
conclusion is that economic property rights to, and tradability in tacit competencies are not
enhanced through expanded protection by means of easy access to standardized patent and
copyright legislation. Such methods may lower the degree of variation in the selection process
and raise the incidence of business mistakes. The solution should rather be to facilitate
flexible and, in one sense possibly more costly, contractual protection through the market in
order to enhance the dynamics of competence blocs. The legal framework must be enabling
with respect to a variety of contractual arrangements that support economic property rights.
Mandatory law for contractual arrangements should be avoided, and legislation should support
arbitration with respect to disputes that are primarily technical in nature.

Obviously, the increased efficiency in the allocation of intangible assets discussed in this
paper contributes to diminishing the underinvestment problem as it is discussed in literature.
The same improvement in the allocation of intellectual capital also contributes to the solution
of a different underinvestment problem not discussed in literature, namely the capturing of
winners that would otherwise have been lost because of weak property rights and low
tradability. This is, however, a conclusion that can only be visualized within the assumptional
domain of the Experimentally Organized Economy.
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Table 1. The Complete balance sheet of a firm
+ (1) Hard ware, financial/visible
+ (2) Intangible
+ (3) Entrepreneurial
----------------------– (4) Debt
- (5) Net worth (= 1+2+3-4)
Source: Eliasson, 2000a; Making Intangibles Visible, in Buiges et al. (2000), Table 3.3, p. 61.

Table 2.

Schumpeterian Creative Destruction

1.Innovative entry
enforces (through competition)
2.Reorganization
3.Rationalization
or
4.Exit (shut down)
Source: ”Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. Lindbeck (ed.), Nya
villkor för ekonomi och politik (SOU 1993:16) and Eliasson (1996a, p. 45).

Table 3A. The dominant selection problem
Error Type I: Losers kept too long
Error Type II: Winners rejected
Source: Eliasson – Eliasson 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 7840, Trimestre.

Table 3B. Actors in the competence bloc
1.

Competent and active customers

2.

Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways

3.

Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations

4.

Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs
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5.

Exit markets that facilitate ownership change

6.

Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production

Source: Eliasson – Eliasson 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 7840, Trimestre.
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